El tejido de confianza
Confianza, tejida dentro.
El tejido de confianza para la economía real: convierte la vida cotidiana en pruebas que son suyas. Un emisor firma una declaración, un titular la guarda y decide quién la ve, y un verificador la comprueba sin llamar jamás al emisor.
RECORDED Revocation field
65,536
slots on this cell’s status list — 0 revoked.
Your browser has not checked yet.
SIMULATED The button changes only what your browser drew. The signed list this cell serves is unchanged, and still says zero.
Checked in your browser
- · Fetch the signed status list
- · Inflate it and count the bits
- · Fetch the trust anchor
- · Recompute its key thumbprint (RFC 7638)
- · Verify the signature
Nothing here is taken on trust: each line is a real call or a real computation, run by you, against the cell that served this page.
Servidos por la celda que ha generado esta página. Ábralos todos si quiere.
LIVE/.well-known/did.jsonLIVE/openapi.jsonLIVE/t/root/status/101 · The insightORBIS — The Trust Fabric
Split trust into three roles — never merge them.
The load-bearing structure. An issuer signs a statement, a holder keeps it and decides who sees it, a verifier checks it without ever calling the issuer. ORBIS enforces the split in architecture rather than in policy, because a split that lives in a policy document is a split that erodes the first time a deadline is tight.
issues → the holder
the holder presents → only the claims that were asked for
the verifier checks the status list only → never “who asked”
The rule that settles every dispute
Facts live in the business engines.
Verifiable statements about those facts are minted and revoked only by the trust fabric.
Held statements and consent live only on the person's device.
Three sentences decide, without argument, where any new feature belongs. That is the whole value of writing them down: the question “where does this go?” stops being a matter of taste.
The seam between these roles is a contract, not a convention — and the dashed edge above is the one that matters most: a verifier reads a status list. It never tells the issuer who asked.
02 · The product spineORBIS — The Trust Fabric
A bill becomes proof. Proof becomes credit.
The reason these systems exist together, in one line: an ordinary obligation becomes portable, holder-owned evidence of creditworthiness — the record a lender actually wants, controlled by the person instead of a bureau.
The consent boundary — everything to the right of this line requires an explicit, signed, revocable act by the holder.
Why the boundary is drawn there
Everything left of the line is bookkeeping: a reading, a bill, a signed item deposited to a wallet. None of it requires the person to decide anything, and none of it moves money.
Everything right of the line is an act. Consent is a device signature over a specific request — not a checkbox, not a stored preference, not a token a processor keeps. It is refusable, and it is revocable after the fact.
What that buys the person
Twelve months of paid utility bills become a credit credential carrying reason codes a regulator can audit.
Delinquency never reaches a score by back channel — only through a presentation the person can see and refuse. The uncomfortable consequence is stated rather than hidden: a person can decline, and a lender may decline them back. That is what control actually costs, and it is the correct trade.
03 · The disciplineORBIS — The Trust Fabric
Honesty is the architecture.
Every rail runs in mock mode until a licensed partner is contracted.
Every issuance surface ships inert behind a kill-switch until identity verification is real.
A platform this size that had shipped credentials before its identity verification was real, or moved money before a licensed rail existed, would be carrying liabilities it could not name. Building inert is slower, and it is the correct order.
Both numbers above are claims against this product, which is why they lead. Every claim for it carries a state label — live, partial, planned, not yet — checked against the cell serving this page, and links the endpoint that settles it. Going live is a human decision reviewed by a human, never a build that quietly flips.
Revocation, published unexercised
This cell serves a real ES256-signed status list at
/t/root/status/1. Decode it and every bit is
zero: the machinery is signed and serving, and it has never revoked anything, because
nothing has been issued to revoke.
That is a gap, and it is published rather than described, because a stranger can check it in one command and catch us if it is ever untrue.
The gaps have their own rows
Two discovery documents this platform should serve, and does not:
/.well-known/did-configuration.json and
/.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer. Both answer 404 here.
They are rows in the register with the state NOT YET, not omissions you would have to find yourself.
04 · Why this winsORBIS — The Trust Fabric
The fabric cannot be retrofitted.
Identity is not a feature that can be added to a platform after the fact. The properties below come from decisions taken at the bottom of the stack, and a product that did not take them cannot acquire them later without becoming a different product.
One API call, not a committee
Onboarding an organisation as a trusted issuer — its own DID, its own key, its status list, its registry entry and its branding — is a single call.
The alternative on offer elsewhere is joining a shared-key identity consortium, where the same result is months of committee work. That comparison is our argument, not a measurement — we have not timed a consortium, and we are not going to print a number we did not take.
Per-organisation keys
A utility, a lender and a health provider each sign under their own key. A regulator can revoke one of them without touching the platform or disturbing the others.
Shared-key schemes cannot offer that property, which is the reason they stall at procurement: the question “what happens when one participant misbehaves?” has no good answer when one key speaks for everyone.
Verification with no phone-home
Checking a credential takes no key, no account and no call back to us. Count it
yourself: the PUB routes in /openapi.json are
the ones that need no credential, ever.
No central choke point, no metadata trail of who checked whom, and no outage of ours that can stop a verification happening.
Standards already on the wire
did:web and OpenID4VCI issuer metadata are LIVE here. SD-JWT VC,
the full OpenID4VCI issuance flow and OpenID4VP are PARTIAL — implemented
and serving, not finished.
This platform is built on the wire eIDAS 2.0 and HAIP 1.0 both select, and every row's real state is published rather than summarised. The standards register carries each one, and the conformance vectors are published so a stranger can run our own tests against us. Certification and conformance runs: none undertaken yet.
05 · Market and timingORBIS — The Trust Fabric
Three converging markets — one regulatory clock.
Third-party estimates about an industry, carried here with the source beside each figure. These are not claims about this platform — every claim about what ORBIS does is elsewhere on this page, with a state label and a link.
Digital identity solutions
$55.7BSource: Precedence Research, digital identity, 2026
Alternative credit scoring
$1.8BSource: Market.us, alternative credit scoring, 2026
Utility customer systems (CIS)
$1.9BSource: Mordor Intelligence, utility CIS, 2026
The forcing function — eIDAS 2.0
2026: EU member states must offer digital identity wallets to every citizen. 2026–2027: banking, telecom, healthcare and large platforms must accept them.
Every relying party in Europe then needs exactly the wire this platform has been built against. Needing the same wire is not the same as being certified against it — our eIDAS row still reads NOT YET, and it will until a certification is actually sought.
Source: Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 (eIDAS 2.0) implementation timeline.
06 · In the productORBIS — The Trust Fabric
The lines the product already says for itself.
The most persuasive sentences here were not written for this page. They were written inside running apps, for the person using them, and they are quoted as found.
Keys on deviceORBIS Wallet — status chip beside the tier badge, native build
90 · Excellent data hygiene. 9 fields kept private this week. 2 organizations can still see your data.ORBIS Wallet — Privacy Pulse; a score for what the person did NOT give away
Only you and [name] can see this. Not even we can.ORBLINK — thread header, verbatim; the counterpart's name is withheld here
What these frames will and will not be captioned as
The native app creates keys in the phone's own hardware. The web export does not. A frame captured from the web build will never be captioned in a way that implies hardware key custody, and each slot below records which surface it is waiting for.
On ORBLINK: message content is end-to-end encrypted and the relay stores ciphertext. This page makes that claim and no other. No statement about the security posture of the surrounding infrastructure appears here, and none will until it has been written up and independently checked. Naming the postures we are not claiming would leave the reader holding them anyway, so this page does not name them.
Frame not yet cleared
native android capture, redacted
Frame not yet cleared
native capture, redacted
Frame not yet cleared
device capture, redacted
Frame not yet cleared
two-device capture, redacted
Each frame above is held empty until it has been redacted and entered in the capture manifest. A raw capture carries a real person's address and identifier, so these slots cannot be pointed at one: the page renders an image only for a frame that has been cleared, and a test proves an uncleared frame stays a frame.
Ask this site
Try:
- IssuerSigns a claim about you. Learns nothing afterwards.
- Holder — youKeeps it. Chooses what to show, and to whom.
- VerifierChecks the signature and the status. Does not call the issuer.
The arrow that is missing is the one that matters: there is none from the verifier back to the issuer, which is why the issuer cannot see where you went.
- Read the token and the key it names.
- Resolve the issuer’s key document.
- Recompute that key’s thumbprint and compare it to the name in the token.
- Verify the signature, using the algorithm the token itself declares.
Every step is arithmetic the receiving party performs. None of it asks the issuer to vouch for the issuer.
ExampleA credential with four claims, of which two are sent:
| Claim | Value | Sent? |
|---|---|---|
| given_name | Ada | sent |
| date_of_birth | 1970-01-01 | withheld |
| over_18 | true | sent |
| address | … | withheld |
The issuer’s signature still verifies over the two that were sent, because the two that were not are committed to as salted digests rather than as values.
Everything this search can see — all 27 pages, and what each one claims
- ORBIS.IDYour identity belongs to you. Right now, it belongs to everyone else.Every time you sign up for something, you hand over a copy of yourself — a photo of your passport, a scan of your face, your date of birth. Those copies pile upSections: The grievance, the Article, and the proof · The problem, in one sentence you already know · Five promises — and what each one actually means · Three people, one seal, no copies · The screen where you decide · What we can see, and what we cannot
- Declaration of Digital IndependenceUniversal Declaration of Digital Independence and Human Digital RightsThe founding document of this estate, written by Jonatan Schmidt and published here unedited. Next to each Article is what the running system actually does abouSections: Universal Grievances Against Digital Oppression · Universal Principles of Digital Sovereignty · A Universal Call to Unified Action · In Witness Whereof · The honest case against this whole idea
- The Trust FabricTrust, woven in.The trust fabric for the real economy — it turns everyday life into proof you own . An issuer signs a statement, a holder keeps it and decides who sees it, and Sections: Split trust into three roles — never merge them. · A bill becomes proof. Proof becomes credit. · Honesty is the architecture. · The fabric cannot be retrofitted. · Three converging markets — one regulatory clock. · The lines the product already says for itself.
- Demo consoleThe only demo here is the real thing.There is no recorded walkthrough on this page, no simulated data and no screenshot of a product. There is a running trust plane and the commands that talk to itSections: 01 · The trust anchor · 02 · What this issuer issues · 03 · Is it healthy right now · 04 · Revocation, signed · 05 · Prove it against the published conformance vectors · Two lists, same page, same weight
- DocumentationGenerated from the route table, so it cannot drift.The wire contract is derived from the live routing table on every request. The document and the server cannot disagree, because one is made out of the other.Sections: Start here · The full contract
- DevelopersEverything below is a live response.Not documentation of an intended one. Five commands, no account, no API key, no sales call. Run them before you decide whether to keep reading.Sections: 01 · The trust anchor · 02 · Issuer metadata · 03 · The credential shape · 04 · Conformance vectors — check your implementation, not ours · 05 · Revocation, signed · Readiness that reports the hardware
- CapabilitiesEvery claim, its real state, and the proof.25 entries: 14 live · 1 partial · 1 planned · 9 not yet. Each one was checked against the cell serving this page. Almost nobody in this industry publishes the rSections: What the four words mean · Identity · Issuance · Operations · Verification · Standards
- StandardsOne row per standard. Including the ones we fail.5 live · 4 partial · 0 planned · 3 not yet. Every row states what the standard demands , what this cell actually does, and the artefact that settles it. Two rowSections: What the four words mean · Credential formats, as their own register · Why every row carries a state
- RegulationsThe posture, in the same discipline.Conformant where it is true, planned where it is not yet, and never silent about the difference. Data minimisation here is a property of the credential format, Sections: Data minimisation, enforced by cryptography · What the four words mean · Compliance and security capabilities · Security · Compliance · Certification status, stated once and plainly
- For peopleThe answer is smaller than the question.You photographed your passport again this month. Someone needed to know one thing about you. They now hold your name, your face, your address and your date of bSections: Prove the fact. Keep everything else. · What changes for you · What is real today, and what is not · If you are here for someone else
- For businessYour own issuer. Your own domain.You mint your own credential types under your own domain. Your members hold them. Your counterparties check them offline, against a public key, with nothing to Sections: You are not early. The deadlines already exist. · The live example is not a mock · What a buyer actually asks · Two lists, same page, same weight · Getting started
- For citiesA city is a tenant, with its own key.Resident credentials a city issues under its own did:web , checked by services across the city with no shared resident database in the middle — because the checSections: Why the architecture is not city-specific · What a city actually gets from this · Two lists, same page, same weight
- For governmentTwo questions, both answered with endpoints.What does it conform to, and what is provable without taking our word for it. Everything below links the artefact that settles it — a document you fetch, a fileSections: The property that comes before everything else · Conformance, one row per standard · Accountability · Two lists, same page, same weight
- PartnersFour roles, and what each one runs.Issuer partners mint their own types under their own tenant. Relying parties verify against the trust anchor. Wallet partners hold on a person's behalf. Data paSections: A page each, with its own evidence · How intake works, and what it costs you · Two lists, same page, same weight
- Apply as a partnerApply, and here is exactly what happens next.The intake is a public, rate-limited endpoint you can call right now. What happens after it is a person, not a pipeline, and this page says which steps are whicSections: Step 1 · Call the intake · Do it here · What each step actually is · What we do with what you send
- Application statusWhere your application is, without asking us.A public endpoint answers with the state of an application you hold the id for. No account, no sign-in, no email thread.Sections: Ask it directly · Check it here · What the states mean
- Issuer partnersYour own key, your own domain, your own exit.An issuer partner runs a tenant with its own did:web , its own signing key, its own status list and its own credential types. The credentials you mint are verifSections: What you actually get, and you can look at all of it now · The formats, as a register · The exit, stated before you sign anything · Two lists, same page, same weight
- Relying-party partnersVerification takes no key. Count the routes.There is nothing to buy and nothing to sign up for on the verifying side. The verification plane takes no authentication at all, and that is a structural properSections: Count it yourself · What you integrate: three fetches · Test your verifier against ours, offline · What is not proved yet, on the record
- Wallet partnersWhat a wallet has to speak to interoperate.The protocols, the format, and the key custody we expect. And the thing no other page in this industry will tell you: nothing has ever completed this flow againSections: The discovery surface, live now · What we expect of you, and what you can expect of us · Aligned with HAIP 1.0
- Data partnersA signed contract, an audit chain, and a short list.A data partner exchanges verified attributes under a signed agreement, with every exchange recorded in a tamper-evident chain. It is also the least built of theSections: What is real underneath · Compliance · What a data partner would get and give · If you want to be first
- Verify with ORBISThe plane designed to survive everything else being down.Verification needs no signing key, no issuer identity and no vault — a cell can be configured for verification alone. It also needs no permission: 107 of this cSections: Three fetches, no account · The honest line between implemented and witnessed · Two lists, same page, same weight
- The clock — the deadlines, counted liveEvery date on this page was set by a parliament, not by us.This is not a roadmap. It is a list of legal instruments with dates attached, and the first one has already gone. Nothing below is written down and left to rot:Sections: The instruments, in the order they bite · Switzerland, and what it actually tells you · What “certified” currently means in this field · To a government reading this · To the people building the same thing · To the person these deadlines are actually about
- How ORBIS compares — and where it loses6 axes. 2 no established vendor holds. 3 we do not hold ourselves.Dozens of vendors sell pieces of this. The founding brief compared fourteen of them across six capabilities and concluded that no competitor held more than threSections: The matrix · Every axis, and how to check it · The discovery probe · What can be proved right now · What we withdrew · The honest gaps
- Your accountAn account with no password to steal.Not a row in our database with your email on it. An ORBIS.ID account is a key , and the half that matters is designed to be born on your own device and never seSections: What an account actually is · How you get one · What the account can do · How to leave with everything · If you are not here as a person
- For your organizationYour own issuer identity — and your own way out.An organization on ORBIS is not an account on our platform. It is a tenant with its own web identity, its own signing key, its own revocation list and its own cSections: What your organization becomes · What onboarding actually involves · What it does not require · Three pages, one for each question · The other two doors
- The operator back officeThe operator console, and the door that will not open yet.Issuance, revocation, the trust registry, the approvals plane, the audit chain and the compliance desk — 195 operator-authenticated operations , the largest surSections: What the back office does · The door, and why it is shut · How an operator signs in · Count it yourself · The other two doors
- Network operations centreEvery panel on this page is a reading your own browser just took.The trust chain resolved live, the revocation field decoded from the signed list, the audit hash chain recomputed link by link, and this cell’s latency measuredSections: The chain that draws itself as it proves itself. · Tamper-evident, and you are welcome to try. · The finding this page would rather report than hide. · What an operator commands, counted from the wire. · Stated here rather than found later.
The words, in plain language — 11 terms, each naming the specification it glosses
- Verifiable credential
- Also searched as: verifiable credential, vc, credential, digital credential, what is a credential, certificate
- A set of claims about someone, signed by whoever issued them. The signature is what makes it verifiable: whoever receives it can prove it has not been altered and can name the key that signed it, without calling the issuer to ask. It is not a login and not a row in somebody’s database — it is a document the subject holds and presents.
- Gloss of W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0. The concrete format on this cell is SD-JWT VC (IETF). This site’s own claim: /capabilities · served by this cell: /manifest
- Issuer, holder, verifier
- Also searched as: issuer, holder, verifier, roles, who is the issuer, difference between issuer and verifier, three roles, relying party
- Three roles, separated on purpose. The ISSUER signs a claim about you. The HOLDER — you — keeps it and decides who sees it. The VERIFIER checks the signature and the status. Because the verifier does not have to call the issuer to do that check, the issuer does not learn where you used the credential. That separation is the entire point of the model; collapse it and you have rebuilt a login provider.
- Gloss of W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0, which defines these three roles. This site’s own claim: /trust-fabric
- The trust chain
- Also searched as: trust chain, how do i know, real, genuine, authentic, fake, forged, tampered, how is it verified, verification, verify, verified, signature, signed, trust anchor, check, checked, proof, prove
- Checking a credential is four steps, in order, and every one of them can be done by the party receiving it. Read the token and the key it names. Resolve the issuer’s key document. Recompute that key’s thumbprint and compare it to the name in the token. Verify the signature with the algorithm the token itself declares. Nothing in that sequence requires trusting the issuer’s word about the issuer.
- Gloss of RFC 7638 (JWK thumbprint), RFC 7515 (JWS), W3C DID Core for resolving the key. This site’s own claim: /trust-fabric · served by this cell: /.well-known/did.json · /conformance/vectors
- Selective disclosure
- Also searched as: selective disclosure, sd-jwt, sd jwt, withhold, hide claims, privacy, share less, minimum disclosure, only show my age, zero knowledge
- Handing over some claims and withholding others without invalidating the issuer’s signature. Each claim is committed to in the signed payload as a salted hash rather than as the value itself; you send only the disclosures you choose, and the receiver recomputes the digests of what you actually sent. Withholding a claim is therefore not an act of trust or of policy — the arithmetic simply does not contain it.
- Gloss of IETF SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC. This site’s own claim: /regulations
- Revocation and status
- Also searched as: revocation, revoked, status list, expired, cancel a credential, withdraw, still valid, status
- A credential can be withdrawn after it is issued, so a verifier needs a way to ask whether this one still stands. A status list answers that as one bit per credential in a single compressed, signed document: the verifier fetches the whole list and reads its own bit, so the issuer never learns which credential was being asked about. The privacy property comes from the shape of the answer, not from a promise.
- Gloss of IETF Token Status List. This site’s own claim: /trust-fabric · served by this cell: /t/root/status/1
- DID — decentralized identifier
- Also searched as: did, decentralized identifier, did:web, did web, identifier, who signed it, public key
- An identifier that resolves to a document containing public keys. The method decides how that resolution happens. did:web makes the identifier a domain name and serves the document at a well-known path, so resolving it is an ordinary HTTPS fetch anyone can perform and nobody needs a ledger, a token or a permissioned network to complete.
- Gloss of W3C DID Core 1.0; method did:web. This site’s own claim: /standards · served by this cell: /.well-known/did.json · /t/root/did.json
- How a credential reaches a wallet
- Also searched as: oid4vci, issuance, issue, get a credential, openid4vci, how do i receive, onboarding a credential
- The protocol a wallet uses to collect a credential from an issuer: the wallet discovers what the issuer offers from a well-known metadata document, obtains authorization, and requests the credential over an ordinary OAuth-shaped exchange. Being ordinary is the feature — it means an issuer does not need a bespoke wallet and a wallet does not need a bespoke issuer.
- Gloss of OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance (OpenID4VCI). This site’s own claim: /standards · served by this cell: /.well-known/openid-credential-issuer · /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
- How a credential is presented
- Also searched as: oid4vp, presentation, present, show a credential, openid4vp, dcql, prove something, log in with a credential
- The protocol a verifier uses to ask for credentials and a wallet uses to answer. The verifier states what it needs as a query rather than naming a provider, and the wallet responds with a presentation bound to that specific request — so a captured answer cannot be replayed at a different verifier.
- Gloss of OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OpenID4VP), with DCQL for the query. This site’s own claim: /standards
- Wallet
- Also searched as: wallet, where is it stored, app, phone, my credentials, hold
- The software the holder keeps credentials in, and the place the holder’s keys are created and stay. The property that matters is not the interface: it is that the private key is generated on the device and never leaves it, because a key held by the provider makes the provider the holder no matter what the screen says.
- Gloss of No single specification; the relevant ones are OpenID4VCI/VP for the protocols and the platform key stores for custody. This site’s own claim: /for-people
- What this site is
- Also searched as: orbis, what is orbis, what does this do, what is this, the platform, product, what do you do, help
- This surface will not summarise the product for you, because a summary is exactly the kind of claim this site refuses to make without a receipt. What it will do is hand you the register: the capability page states what is live, what is partial and what is not built, each one linked to the endpoint that proves it.
- Gloss of Not a specification — a register. This site’s own claim: /capabilities · served by this cell: /openapi.json · /build
- The standards
- Also searched as: standards, specifications, specs, interoperable, eidas, regulation, compliance, conformance
- Verifiable credentials are not one standard but a stack: a data model, a serialization, a protocol to issue, a protocol to present, a way to identify keys and a way to publish status. Interoperability claims are only meaningful per layer, which is why a page that claims the whole stack at once is telling you nothing.
- Gloss of W3C VC 2.0, IETF SD-JWT VC, OpenID4VCI/VP, W3C DID Core, IETF Token Status List. This site’s own claim: /standards · served by this cell: /conformance/vectors