حسابك

حساب بلا كلمة مرور تُسرق.

ليس سطرًا في قاعدة بياناتنا يحمل بريدك. حساب ORBIS.ID مفتاح، والنصف الذي يهم منه مصمَّم ليُولد على جهازك أنت ولا يُرسل إلينا أبدًا. فليس عندنا ما يمكن أن يتسرب، ولا عندك ما يلزم إعادة استخدامه، ولا شيء تحتاج أن تستأذننا لتأخذه معك.

لا يمكنك إتمام إنشاء حساب على هذه الخلية اليوم، وهذا بالضبط موضع التوقف. النصف الذي يجري في المتصفح من مراسم الدخول حقيقي وعامل: /account/signin يستجيب، وكل تحميل يسكّ تذكرة حقيقية تُستخدم مرة واحدة. أما نصف الهاتف فيحتاج محفظة تنتج توقيع جهاز، وهذه الخلية لا تقدّم أي محفظة: فالمراسم تبدأ، ولا شيء هنا يستطيع إتمامها. وكل خطوة أدناه تحمل الحالة التي قِسناها، لا الحالة التي ننويها.
فتح مراسم الدخوللماذا بُني على هذا النحو

تقدّمها الخلية نفسها التي أنتجت هذه الصفحة. افتحها جميعًا إن شئت.

LIVE/account/signinLIVE/openapi.json
هذه الصفحة مترجمة جزئيًا. التنقل والعنوان والملخّص وكل التنبيهات أعلاه مترجمة. أما الأقسام المطوّلة أدناه فما زالت بالإنجليزية، ولا تُترجم آليًا في الخلفية: أنت تقرأ النص الأصلي لا تخمينًا له. قراءة الصفحة كاملة بالإنجليزية.
01

What an account actually is

a key, not a record

Almost every account you own is a row in somebody's database with a secret next to it. Yours can be taken by anyone who takes the database. This one is built the other way round, and the difference is not a feature — it is the whole design.

01

You are a key fingerprint

The session an ORBIS.ID sign-in creates knows you by the fingerprint of a public key, not by an address. There is no username here, because there is nothing a username would be needed for.

02

There is no password

Nothing to phish, nothing to reuse across sites, nothing to rotate after somebody else’s breach, and nothing on our side worth stealing. You cannot lose a password you were never issued.

03

We are designed never to hold your half NOT YET

The private half is meant to be created inside your device and to stay there. On this cell that has never happened, because no wallet is served here — so this is the design, stated as a design, and not a claim about a key any device has actually held.

04

Leaving is a route, not a request

Portability and erasure are endpoints with method signatures, not an email address and a promise about thirty days. Section 04 below says precisely what each one returns.

02

How you get one

four steps, two of them real here

The ceremony is deliberately split across two devices: the browser asks, and the phone approves. That is what makes a stolen screen useless. Each step below carries what it does on the cell that served you this page.

Step 01 · LIVE

Open the ceremony

You land on /account/signin and the cell mints a real single-use ticket for that page load, then draws it as a QR code.

Open it right now — it answers.
Step 02 · NOT YET

Your phone approves it

Your wallet reads the QR and signs the approval with the key on your device. The route that accepts it takes a device signature and nothing else.

No wallet is served by this cell, so nothing here can sign.
Step 03 · PARTIAL

The browser gets a session

The approval turns into a session that identifies you by key fingerprint. The machinery is implemented and gated; it cannot be witnessed end to end here, because step 02 cannot happen.

Built and refusing correctly — not yet completable.
Step 04 · LIVE (refusing)

Your account answers you

/account stops refusing and starts answering. Today it answers everybody the same way, which is the correct behaviour for a door nobody has a key to.

Measured: 401, “account session required”.
What you will see if you click /account right now. A single line of JSON: {"error":"account session required"}. That is the route working, not the route broken — but a person who clicks a link and gets raw JSON with no warning reasonably assumes they did something wrong. They did not. Nobody can sign in on this cell yet, so the door refuses everyone equally.
03

What the account can do

every surface, and its real state

The account plane is small on purpose. 5 routes answer to a signed-in person and 12 answer to a device signature — you do not have to take that from us, because /openapi.json is the route census and it names the auth plane of every row. Count them yourself.

01

See what we hold LIVE

GET /account/data returns your key fingerprint and whether you are enrolled. It deliberately does not join your directory listing — resolving that needs a separate peppered lookup, and this surface is not allowed to become a second way to correlate you. A privacy property enforced by an omission in the code, not a policy in a document.

02

Take a copy LIVE

POST /account/export returns everything the platform can link to your fingerprint without that peppered lookup, stamped with the time it was exported. Machine readable, no ticket, no waiting period, no negotiation.

03

Ask to be erased LIVE

POST /account/erase takes confirm:true and erases you on the spot — one synchronous call, no queue, no reviewer. Your membership record is crypto-shredded before the response is sent, and the response names exactly what was destroyed and what remains, unlinkably. Section 04 says the rest.

04

End the session LIVE

POST /account/signout spends the session token server-side and clears the cookie. The token is consumed, not merely forgotten by your browser.

04

How to leave with everything

the exit, described by the people who built it

A product that is genuinely yours has to be describable in terms of how you stop using it. Most identity vendors answer this question in a support article. Here it is two endpoints and one honest caveat.

LIVE The copy is yours immediately

  • One call, no ticket. POST /account/export hands back a timestamped record of everything linkable to your fingerprint. There is no queue and no human in the path.
  • What it deliberately excludes. Your directory listing is not in it. That is not an omission we are hiding — joining it here would build exactly the correlation path the directory law forbids, so the listing rides its own contract.
  • Nothing to re-create elsewhere. Credentials you hold were signed by the organisations that issued them and are verifiable against their keys, not ours. They do not stop being true because you left.

LIVE Erasure runs the moment you ask

  • What actually happens. Your call crypto-shreds your membership record and the one-time allocations held against it, in the same transaction that closes the request — either the subject is severed and the request completes, or nothing moved and you get an error, never a 200 over a half-erasure. It also signs you out.
  • What survives, and why it no longer identifies you. Your entries in the append-only member ledger stand — they cannot be rewritten, which is what makes them trustworthy — but the link to you is gone, so they no longer point to anybody. The tamper-evident audit record that an erasure happened, and when, also stands, and never named whose data it was.
  • Why we say so. This page used to describe an erase button that only filed a request, because that was the honest truth of an earlier build. The machinery that actually erases now has production callers, so this page says the stronger true thing — not because a green chip is owed, but because the weaker sentence would now be a lie.
05

If you are not here as a person

the other two doors
01

Your organization

What your company becomes on ORBIS — its own issuer identity, its own key, its own status list, and its own exit.

 02

The back office

What an operator runs, and the honest state of the door they sign in through.

 03

The full register

Every claim on this site with its measured state and the endpoint that settles it — including the rows that say no.

If a state on this page is wrong, that is worth more to us than a polite email: the reporting route is /.well-known/security.txt.

Ask this site

This is a search, not a language model. There is no AI on this cell: nothing here is generated, your question never leaves your browser, and no request is made when you ask. It searches this site’s own 27 pages and a glossary of 11 terms. You can open and read both below: what this search can see is exactly what you can see. When nothing answers, it says so rather than writing something that sounds like an answer.

Try:

Everything this search can see — all 27 pages, and what each one claims
  • ORBIS.IDYour identity belongs to you. Right now, it belongs to everyone else.Every time you sign up for something, you hand over a copy of yourself — a photo of your passport, a scan of your face, your date of birth. Those copies pile upSections: The grievance, the Article, and the proof · The problem, in one sentence you already know · Five promises — and what each one actually means · Three people, one seal, no copies · The screen where you decide · What we can see, and what we cannot
  • Declaration of Digital IndependenceUniversal Declaration of Digital Independence and Human Digital RightsThe founding document of this estate, written by Jonatan Schmidt and published here unedited. Next to each Article is what the running system actually does abouSections: Universal Grievances Against Digital Oppression · Universal Principles of Digital Sovereignty · A Universal Call to Unified Action · In Witness Whereof · The honest case against this whole idea
  • The Trust FabricTrust, woven in.The trust fabric for the real economy — it turns everyday life into proof you own . An issuer signs a statement, a holder keeps it and decides who sees it, and Sections: Split trust into three roles — never merge them. · A bill becomes proof. Proof becomes credit. · Honesty is the architecture. · The fabric cannot be retrofitted. · Three converging markets — one regulatory clock. · The lines the product already says for itself.
  • Demo consoleThe only demo here is the real thing.There is no recorded walkthrough on this page, no simulated data and no screenshot of a product. There is a running trust plane and the commands that talk to itSections: 01 · The trust anchor · 02 · What this issuer issues · 03 · Is it healthy right now · 04 · Revocation, signed · 05 · Prove it against the published conformance vectors · Two lists, same page, same weight
  • DocumentationGenerated from the route table, so it cannot drift.The wire contract is derived from the live routing table on every request. The document and the server cannot disagree, because one is made out of the other.Sections: Start here · The full contract
  • DevelopersEverything below is a live response.Not documentation of an intended one. Five commands, no account, no API key, no sales call. Run them before you decide whether to keep reading.Sections: 01 · The trust anchor · 02 · Issuer metadata · 03 · The credential shape · 04 · Conformance vectors — check your implementation, not ours · 05 · Revocation, signed · Readiness that reports the hardware
  • CapabilitiesEvery claim, its real state, and the proof.25 entries: 14 live · 1 partial · 1 planned · 9 not yet. Each one was checked against the cell serving this page. Almost nobody in this industry publishes the rSections: What the four words mean · Identity · Issuance · Operations · Verification · Standards
  • StandardsOne row per standard. Including the ones we fail.5 live · 4 partial · 0 planned · 3 not yet. Every row states what the standard demands , what this cell actually does, and the artefact that settles it. Two rowSections: What the four words mean · Credential formats, as their own register · Why every row carries a state
  • RegulationsThe posture, in the same discipline.Conformant where it is true, planned where it is not yet, and never silent about the difference. Data minimisation here is a property of the credential format, Sections: Data minimisation, enforced by cryptography · What the four words mean · Compliance and security capabilities · Security · Compliance · Certification status, stated once and plainly
  • For peopleThe answer is smaller than the question.You photographed your passport again this month. Someone needed to know one thing about you. They now hold your name, your face, your address and your date of bSections: Prove the fact. Keep everything else. · What changes for you · What is real today, and what is not · If you are here for someone else
  • For businessYour own issuer. Your own domain.You mint your own credential types under your own domain. Your members hold them. Your counterparties check them offline, against a public key, with nothing to Sections: You are not early. The deadlines already exist. · The live example is not a mock · What a buyer actually asks · Two lists, same page, same weight · Getting started
  • For citiesA city is a tenant, with its own key.Resident credentials a city issues under its own did:web , checked by services across the city with no shared resident database in the middle — because the checSections: Why the architecture is not city-specific · What a city actually gets from this · Two lists, same page, same weight
  • For governmentTwo questions, both answered with endpoints.What does it conform to, and what is provable without taking our word for it. Everything below links the artefact that settles it — a document you fetch, a fileSections: The property that comes before everything else · Conformance, one row per standard · Accountability · Two lists, same page, same weight
  • PartnersFour roles, and what each one runs.Issuer partners mint their own types under their own tenant. Relying parties verify against the trust anchor. Wallet partners hold on a person's behalf. Data paSections: A page each, with its own evidence · How intake works, and what it costs you · Two lists, same page, same weight
  • Apply as a partnerApply, and here is exactly what happens next.The intake is a public, rate-limited endpoint you can call right now. What happens after it is a person, not a pipeline, and this page says which steps are whicSections: Step 1 · Call the intake · Do it here · What each step actually is · What we do with what you send
  • Application statusWhere your application is, without asking us.A public endpoint answers with the state of an application you hold the id for. No account, no sign-in, no email thread.Sections: Ask it directly · Check it here · What the states mean
  • Issuer partnersYour own key, your own domain, your own exit.An issuer partner runs a tenant with its own did:web , its own signing key, its own status list and its own credential types. The credentials you mint are verifSections: What you actually get, and you can look at all of it now · The formats, as a register · The exit, stated before you sign anything · Two lists, same page, same weight
  • Relying-party partnersVerification takes no key. Count the routes.There is nothing to buy and nothing to sign up for on the verifying side. The verification plane takes no authentication at all, and that is a structural properSections: Count it yourself · What you integrate: three fetches · Test your verifier against ours, offline · What is not proved yet, on the record
  • Wallet partnersWhat a wallet has to speak to interoperate.The protocols, the format, and the key custody we expect. And the thing no other page in this industry will tell you: nothing has ever completed this flow againSections: The discovery surface, live now · What we expect of you, and what you can expect of us · Aligned with HAIP 1.0
  • Data partnersA signed contract, an audit chain, and a short list.A data partner exchanges verified attributes under a signed agreement, with every exchange recorded in a tamper-evident chain. It is also the least built of theSections: What is real underneath · Compliance · What a data partner would get and give · If you want to be first
  • Verify with ORBISThe plane designed to survive everything else being down.Verification needs no signing key, no issuer identity and no vault — a cell can be configured for verification alone. It also needs no permission: 107 of this cSections: Three fetches, no account · The honest line between implemented and witnessed · Two lists, same page, same weight
  • The clock — the deadlines, counted liveEvery date on this page was set by a parliament, not by us.This is not a roadmap. It is a list of legal instruments with dates attached, and the first one has already gone. Nothing below is written down and left to rot:Sections: The instruments, in the order they bite · Switzerland, and what it actually tells you · What “certified” currently means in this field · To a government reading this · To the people building the same thing · To the person these deadlines are actually about
  • How ORBIS compares — and where it loses6 axes. 2 no established vendor holds. 3 we do not hold ourselves.Dozens of vendors sell pieces of this. The founding brief compared fourteen of them across six capabilities and concluded that no competitor held more than threSections: The matrix · Every axis, and how to check it · The discovery probe · What can be proved right now · What we withdrew · The honest gaps
  • Your accountAn account with no password to steal.Not a row in our database with your email on it. An ORBIS.ID account is a key , and the half that matters is designed to be born on your own device and never seSections: What an account actually is · How you get one · What the account can do · How to leave with everything · If you are not here as a person
  • For your organizationYour own issuer identity — and your own way out.An organization on ORBIS is not an account on our platform. It is a tenant with its own web identity, its own signing key, its own revocation list and its own cSections: What your organization becomes · What onboarding actually involves · What it does not require · Three pages, one for each question · The other two doors
  • The operator back officeThe operator console, and the door that will not open yet.Issuance, revocation, the trust registry, the approvals plane, the audit chain and the compliance desk — 195 operator-authenticated operations , the largest surSections: What the back office does · The door, and why it is shut · How an operator signs in · Count it yourself · The other two doors
  • Network operations centreEvery panel on this page is a reading your own browser just took.The trust chain resolved live, the revocation field decoded from the signed list, the audit hash chain recomputed link by link, and this cell’s latency measuredSections: The chain that draws itself as it proves itself. · Tamper-evident, and you are welcome to try. · The finding this page would rather report than hide. · What an operator commands, counted from the wire. · Stated here rather than found later.
The words, in plain language — 11 terms, each naming the specification it glosses
Verifiable credential
Also searched as: verifiable credential, vc, credential, digital credential, what is a credential, certificate
A set of claims about someone, signed by whoever issued them. The signature is what makes it verifiable: whoever receives it can prove it has not been altered and can name the key that signed it, without calling the issuer to ask. It is not a login and not a row in somebody’s database — it is a document the subject holds and presents.
Gloss of W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0. The concrete format on this cell is SD-JWT VC (IETF). This site’s own claim: /capabilities · served by this cell: /manifest
Issuer, holder, verifier
Also searched as: issuer, holder, verifier, roles, who is the issuer, difference between issuer and verifier, three roles, relying party
Three roles, separated on purpose. The ISSUER signs a claim about you. The HOLDER — you — keeps it and decides who sees it. The VERIFIER checks the signature and the status. Because the verifier does not have to call the issuer to do that check, the issuer does not learn where you used the credential. That separation is the entire point of the model; collapse it and you have rebuilt a login provider.
Gloss of W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0, which defines these three roles. This site’s own claim: /trust-fabric
The trust chain
Also searched as: trust chain, how do i know, real, genuine, authentic, fake, forged, tampered, how is it verified, verification, verify, verified, signature, signed, trust anchor, check, checked, proof, prove
Checking a credential is four steps, in order, and every one of them can be done by the party receiving it. Read the token and the key it names. Resolve the issuer’s key document. Recompute that key’s thumbprint and compare it to the name in the token. Verify the signature with the algorithm the token itself declares. Nothing in that sequence requires trusting the issuer’s word about the issuer.
Gloss of RFC 7638 (JWK thumbprint), RFC 7515 (JWS), W3C DID Core for resolving the key. This site’s own claim: /trust-fabric · served by this cell: /.well-known/did.json · /conformance/vectors
Selective disclosure
Also searched as: selective disclosure, sd-jwt, sd jwt, withhold, hide claims, privacy, share less, minimum disclosure, only show my age, zero knowledge
Handing over some claims and withholding others without invalidating the issuer’s signature. Each claim is committed to in the signed payload as a salted hash rather than as the value itself; you send only the disclosures you choose, and the receiver recomputes the digests of what you actually sent. Withholding a claim is therefore not an act of trust or of policy — the arithmetic simply does not contain it.
Gloss of IETF SD-JWT and SD-JWT VC. This site’s own claim: /regulations
Revocation and status
Also searched as: revocation, revoked, status list, expired, cancel a credential, withdraw, still valid, status
A credential can be withdrawn after it is issued, so a verifier needs a way to ask whether this one still stands. A status list answers that as one bit per credential in a single compressed, signed document: the verifier fetches the whole list and reads its own bit, so the issuer never learns which credential was being asked about. The privacy property comes from the shape of the answer, not from a promise.
Gloss of IETF Token Status List. This site’s own claim: /trust-fabric · served by this cell: /t/root/status/1
DID — decentralized identifier
Also searched as: did, decentralized identifier, did:web, did web, identifier, who signed it, public key
An identifier that resolves to a document containing public keys. The method decides how that resolution happens. did:web makes the identifier a domain name and serves the document at a well-known path, so resolving it is an ordinary HTTPS fetch anyone can perform and nobody needs a ledger, a token or a permissioned network to complete.
Gloss of W3C DID Core 1.0; method did:web. This site’s own claim: /standards · served by this cell: /.well-known/did.json · /t/root/did.json
How a credential reaches a wallet
Also searched as: oid4vci, issuance, issue, get a credential, openid4vci, how do i receive, onboarding a credential
The protocol a wallet uses to collect a credential from an issuer: the wallet discovers what the issuer offers from a well-known metadata document, obtains authorization, and requests the credential over an ordinary OAuth-shaped exchange. Being ordinary is the feature — it means an issuer does not need a bespoke wallet and a wallet does not need a bespoke issuer.
Gloss of OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance (OpenID4VCI). This site’s own claim: /standards · served by this cell: /.well-known/openid-credential-issuer · /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
How a credential is presented
Also searched as: oid4vp, presentation, present, show a credential, openid4vp, dcql, prove something, log in with a credential
The protocol a verifier uses to ask for credentials and a wallet uses to answer. The verifier states what it needs as a query rather than naming a provider, and the wallet responds with a presentation bound to that specific request — so a captured answer cannot be replayed at a different verifier.
Gloss of OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OpenID4VP), with DCQL for the query. This site’s own claim: /standards
Wallet
Also searched as: wallet, where is it stored, app, phone, my credentials, hold
The software the holder keeps credentials in, and the place the holder’s keys are created and stay. The property that matters is not the interface: it is that the private key is generated on the device and never leaves it, because a key held by the provider makes the provider the holder no matter what the screen says.
Gloss of No single specification; the relevant ones are OpenID4VCI/VP for the protocols and the platform key stores for custody. This site’s own claim: /for-people
What this site is
Also searched as: orbis, what is orbis, what does this do, what is this, the platform, product, what do you do, help
This surface will not summarise the product for you, because a summary is exactly the kind of claim this site refuses to make without a receipt. What it will do is hand you the register: the capability page states what is live, what is partial and what is not built, each one linked to the endpoint that proves it.
Gloss of Not a specification — a register. This site’s own claim: /capabilities · served by this cell: /openapi.json · /build
The standards
Also searched as: standards, specifications, specs, interoperable, eidas, regulation, compliance, conformance
Verifiable credentials are not one standard but a stack: a data model, a serialization, a protocol to issue, a protocol to present, a way to identify keys and a way to publish status. Interoperability claims are only meaningful per layer, which is why a page that claims the whole stack at once is telling you nothing.
Gloss of W3C VC 2.0, IETF SD-JWT VC, OpenID4VCI/VP, W3C DID Core, IETF Token Status List. This site’s own claim: /standards · served by this cell: /conformance/vectors